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A common argument
since the terrorist attacks in New York andWashington, D.C., on September 11,
2001, is that while economic globalization brings enhanced efciency, this
comes at the cost of greater vulnerability to terrorism. Audrey Kurth Cronin
maintains, “The current wave of international terrorism, characterized by un-
predictable and unprecedented threats from nonstate actors, not only is a reac-
tion to globalization but is facilitated by it.”1 “It would be naïve to assume,”
says Cronin, “that what is good for international commerce and communica-
tion is not also good for international terrorists.”2 Similarly, Kurt Campbell
contends, “Much has been written about the forces of globalization—the re-
lentless expansion of market forces and the constant search for greater eco-
nomic efciencies. . . . Many of the things that have left Western societies
vulnerable to terrorist attacks are the very efciencies that have come as a con-
sequence of the relentless search for efciency and the maximization of pro-
ductivity, by person, companies, and countries.”3 Stanley Hoffman argues that
Islamic terrorism is partly fueled by “a resistance to ‘unjust´ economic glo-
balization. . . . Insofar as globalization enriches some and uproots many,
those who are both poor and uprooted may seek revenge and self-esteem in
terrorism.”4
This perspective is not just wrong; it is also dangerous. Economic globaliza-
tion is a double-edged sword: It has the potential both to enhance and to re-
duce the terrorist threat simultaneously. It is crucial to reduce the number of
vulnerabilities associated with economic globalization, such as by developing
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more rigorous border inspection procedures.5 Yet it also must be recognized
that many of the most effective tools for dealing with the terrorist threat are
themselves partly the products of globalization. Many scholars now focus on
the potential need to restrict economic globalization to reduce the terrorist
threat.6 In contrast, we argue that globalization presents opportunities, not just
challenges, in the effort to deal with international terrorism.
In this article, we show that the full range of effects of economic globaliza-
tion need to be considered when examining the bioterrorist threat and how
best to respond to it. Improving defenses against a biological weapons (BW) at-
tack is a principal security issue facing the United States and the world in the
twenty-rst century.7 Even before the anthrax attacks in the fall of 2001, there
was a growing understanding within the security and global health communi-
ties that pathogens pose a threat equal to, if not greater than, military might.8
Biological weapons offer a relatively inexpensive and surreptitious method
of inicting mass casualties.9 As one recent analysis concludes, “Biotechnology
is one of only two technologies that truly deserve the label ‘agent of mass
destruction´ and it is by far the more accessible of the two.”10 Given the
difculties of policing their proliferation or tracing their source once deployed,
5. See Stephen E. Flynn, “America the Vulnerable,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 1 (January/Febru-
ary 2002), pp. 60–75; and Stephen E. Flynn, “Beyond Border Control,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 6
(November/December 2000), pp. 57–68.
6. See, for example, Richard Betts, “The Soft Underbelly of American Primacy: Tactical Advan-
tages of Terror,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 117, No. 1 (Spring 2002), p. 30.
7. See, for example, David F. Gordon, Lt. Col. Don Noah, and George Fidas, “The Global Infec-
tious Disease Threat and Its Implications for the United States,” National Intelligence Estimate 99-
17D (January 2000); William S. Cohen, Annual Report to the President and the Congress (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, April 1997); Richard A. Falkenrath, Robert D. Newman, and
Bradley A. Thayer, America s´ Achilles´Heel: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Terrorism and Covert At-
tack (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1998); Andrew T. Price-Smith, The Health of Nations: Infectious
Disease, Environmental Change, and Their Effects on National Security and Development (Cambridge,
Mass.: MIT Press, 2001); Jessica Stern, “Dreaded Risks and the Control of Biological Weapons,” In-
ternational Security, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Winter 2002/03), pp. 94–99; and Gregory Koblentz, “Pathogens
as Weapons: The International Security Implications of Biological Warfare,” Ph.D. dissertation,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, forthcoming.
8. See, for example, Gordon, Noah, and Fidas, “The Global Infectious Disease Threat and Its Im-
plications for the United States”; Cohen, Annual Report to the President and the Congress; Falkenrath,
Newman, and Thayer, America s´ Achilles´ Heel; and Price-Smith, The Health of Nations.
9. According to one study, 100 kilograms of aerosolized anthrax is sufcient to cause 3 million
deaths in a densely populated area. Ofce of Technology Assessment, Proliferation of Weapons of
Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks, OTA-ISC-559 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing
Ofce, 1993), p. 53.
10. John Steinbruner, Elisa Harris, Nancy Gallagher, and Stacy Gunther, Controlling Dangerous
Pathogens: A Prototype Protective Oversight System, CISSM Working Paper (College Park, Md.: Cen-
ter for International Security Studies at Maryland, February 5, 2003), http://www.puaf.umd.edu/
CISSM/Publications/AMCS/nalmonograph.pdf.
biological weapons will remain attractive to any individual, group, or nation
with a desire to inict harm and to avoid detection. The biological threat is
grave, and it is here to stay.
Although it is misleading to assume that it will be possible to devise a tech-
nological “x” to this threat, advances in science and technology lie at the
core of U.S. efforts to develop a comprehensive biodefense strategy. Yet, as
with economic globalization, science and technology possess a double-edged
quality. Although open systems of research, communication, and commerce fa-
cilitate the development of biomedical countermeasures such as new vaccines,
therapeutics, and diagnostics, these systems also support advances in the de-
velopment of biological weapons. How is it possible to maximize innovation
and efciency in the development of technologies to thwart bioterrorists while
minimizing the potential abuses of biotechnology? To assess the inuence of
globalization on U.S. biodefense strategies, we examine the dynamics of inno-
vation for a core biodefense technology: vaccines.
The rst section of this article argues that investment in better defensive
measures is crucial for the United States and other countries that are vulner-
able to the threat of bioterrorism, and that no credible defensive effort can
move forward without accelerating the rate of biodefense vaccine develop-
ment. As we show, however, the rate of vaccine development has fallen far be-
hind the growing number of biological threats over the past several decades.
In the second section, we demonstrate that international collaboration
among rms has more potential benets for furthering vaccine development
than scholars currently recognize. A number of recent analyses have stressed
the need to preserve international openness in the academic sector to promote
advances in the biological sciences.11 An issue that has so far been neglected,
yet holds greater near-term signicance for U.S. biodefense capabilities, is the
importance of globalization in commercial sectors that contribute to the ad-
vancement of biodefense technologies.
In the third section, we examine the implications of the new regulatory
framework for governing biological research and commerce that federal agen-
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11. See, for example, Stern, “Dreaded Risks and the Control of Biological Weapons”; Eugene
Skolnikoff, “Research Universities and National Security: Can Traditional Values Survive?” in Al-
bert H. Teich, Stephen D. Nelson, and Stephen J. Lita, eds., Science and Technology in a Vulnerable
World: Supplement to AAAS Science and Technology Policy Yearbook 2003 (Washington, D.C.: American
Association for the Advancement of Science, 2002); and Vincent Chan, Jerome Friedman, Stephen
Graves, Harvey Sapolsky, and Sheila Widnall, In the Public Interest: Report of the Ad Hoc Faculty
Committee on Access to and Disclosure of Scientic Information (Cambridge, Mass.: Massachusetts In-
stitute of Technology, June 12, 2002).
cies and lawmakers in the United States put in place in the aftermath of the
September 2001 terrorist attacks. This new regulatory framework is designed
to enhance U.S. security by reducing the ability of terrorists to access the infor-
mation and materials needed to produce biological weapons. As we show,
however, the framework is likely to have an unintended negative inuence on
the current U.S. effort to develop enhanced biodefense capabilities, because it
creates incentives to shift away from international collaboration in biodefense
research and production.
In the fourth section, we argue that U.S. biodefense policy needs to be ad-
justed in light of the signicance of economic globalization. To ensure that the
globalization of biodefense continues, we maintain that the best way forward
is to harmonize regulations concerning biological research and commerce
through the creation of an international biosecurity regime.
The Growing Vaccine Gap
To reduce the threat of biological terrorism, rapid progress in vaccine develop-
ment is paramount. This section outlines two issues concerning the role of vac-
cines in biosecurity: the strategic value of vaccines relative to other threat
reduction measures and the problems surrounding vaccine development and
supply.
the strategic value of vaccines
The U.S. national strategy to reduce the biological weapons threat comprises
three tactics: nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and defense—or “conse-
quence management.”12 The strategy recognizes that no one tactic is sufcient
to address the threat and that all three must be pursued simultaneously. Al-
though all three are useful for countering the threat from bioterrorism, a com-
parison of their potential efcacy reveals that improving defenses must
become central to this strategy and that vaccines lie at the heart of this effort.
U.S. biological weapon nonproliferation policy rests on a collection of
arms control measures that, thus far, have failed to prevent the spread of bio-
logical weapons technology, in large part due to the twin challenges of moni-
toring and enforcement. In 2001, President George W. Bush´s administration
withdrew support from efforts to strengthen the cornerstone of the U.S. non-
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12. White House, The National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, December 2002,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/WMDStrategy.pdf.
proliferation strategy—the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
(BTWC)—arguing that the draft verication protocol put forth at the Fifth Re-
view Conference would not effectively limit proliferation. Given the current
challenge of achieving international consensus on an enforceable verication
protocol, the strength of legally binding multilateral treaty solutions in this
area remains uncertain.13 Apart from the BTWC, the U.S. government has sup-
ported export controls through the Australia Group, composed of a committee
of thirty-three countries and the European Commission. Through a non-legally
binding agreement, members limit the export of materials and technologies
relevant to the production of chemical and biological weapons to proliferant
countries.14 However, given the dual-use nature of the materials controlled un-
der this agreement and the global expansion of the biotechnology and pharma-
ceutical sectors, scholars strongly doubt the effectiveness of export controls
over the long term.15 Finally, the Harvard Sussex Program on Chemical and
Biological Weapons Armament and Arms Limitation has called for an interna-
tional convention to criminalize chemical and biological weapons develop-
ment and related activities.16 Such a law would promulgate a valuable
normative prohibition against biological weapons among states. As the experi-
ence of weapons inspectors in Iraq in the early and mid-1990s demonstrated,
however, determining whether a state possesses biological weapons can be ex-
tremely difcult: Without sufcient evidence, international courts will be un-
able to successfully prosecute suspected violators.
U.S. BW counterproliferation policy relies on a range of deterrents, including
surveillance and interdiction, political persuasion, and the threat of over-
whelming military force to preempt or respond to a biological attack.17 All of
these strategies have limited utility, however, because biological weapons eas-
ily escape early detection, favor the attacker, and are difcult to trace.18 Al-
A Double-Edged Sword 127
13. Mark Wheelis and Malcom Dando, “On the Brink: Biodefence, Biotechnology, and the Future
of Weapons Control,” CBW Conventions Bulletin, No. 58 (December 2002), p. 3; statement by Jona-
than B. Tucker before the Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Ser-
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15. Tucker, “The Proliferation of Chemical and Biological Weapons Materials and Technologies to
State and Sub-State Actors”; and Steinbruner et al., “Controlling Dangerous Pathogens.”
16. Matthew Meselson, “Averting the Hostile Exploitation of Biotechnology,” CBW Conventions
Bulletin, No. 48 (June 2000), pp. 16–19.
17. White House, The National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction.
18. See the discussion in Koblentz, “Pathogens as Weapons.”
though not traditionally considered a deterrent, vaccines are one of the few
remaining tools available to deter a biological attack.19 By limiting the efcacy
of biological weapons, vaccines reduce their attractiveness and thereby offer
some means of deterring their use.
Given the current limitations of U.S. BW nonproliferation and counter-
proliferation strategies, security planners have a clear need to emphasize de-
fense.20 Limiting the severity of a biological attack will hinge on a variety of
factors. One is the ability to detect and diagnose the release of a select agent
through heightened surveillance and medical training. Another is the ability to
prevent, respond to, and recover from a biological attack.21 To this end, vac-
cines not only are a crucial defensive resource, but they also enable other
defensive measures to work more effectively. As Philip Russell (former com-
mander of the U.S. Army R&D Command) argues, the success of any U.S. re-
sponse to the deliberate release of a highly infectious organism will depend on
“the rapidity of the public health response, the effectiveness of a vaccination
campaign, and, most importantly, the availability of vaccine.”22 Building ca-
pacity in the health care system to respond to a large-scale biological attack,
devising and practicing quarantine protocols, and developing protective
equipment such as building lters and respiratory gear—all will have much
greater efcacy in conjunction with vaccines. For example, vaccinated emer-
gency and health care workers can enter biologically contaminated areas to tri-
age victims and administer vaccines that will, in turn, shorten the length of the
quarantine. Vaccines can also be used to protect surrounding populations from
secondary waves of infection.
As with all other threat-reduction strategies, however, vaccines cannot offer
perfect security. Given the potentially wide range of pathogens that could be
used in a biological attack, attempting to vaccinate the U.S. population as a
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19. Other medical countermeasures, such as antivirals and broad-spectrum antibiotics, would also
be useful in efforts to deter or mitigate biological attacks. We focus our discussion on vaccines,
however, because, relative to antivirals, their development is more feasible within a ten-year time
frame. National Research Council, Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in
Countering Terrorism (Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2002), p. 87. Although it may
be more feasible to develop broad-spectrum antibiotics in the near term, their usefulness is limited
to bacterial pathogens, which account for only 29 percent of the Department of Health and Human
Services´ select agent list. See http://www.cdc.gov/od/sap/docs/salist.pdf.
20. For a related discussion, see Paul Schulte, “The Uncertainly Horrifying Prospect of Biological
Weapons: International Risks, Responses, and Dilemmas,” Harvard University, March 20, 2003.
21. National Research Council, Making the Nation Safer, p. 68.
22. Philip K. Russell, “Vaccines in Civilian Defense against Bioterrorism,” Emerging Infectious Dis-
eases, Vol. 5, No. 4 (July/August 1999), p. 532.
rst line of defense is impractical. Vaccines are invaluable, however, in several
of the postattack scenarios described above. This would be particularly true in
the event of an anthrax or a smallpox attack, because these vaccines can be
used for postexposure prophylaxis.
vaccine development and supply problems
Vaccines are vitally important in deterring and mitigating biological attacks,
and security planners cannot take their availability for granted. Over the past
thirty years, the rate of biodefense vaccine development has not kept pace with
the growing number of biological threats facing the United States. Of the forty-
nine biological threat agents identied by the Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS), the Federal Drug Administration (FDA) has licensed
vaccines to protect against only four agents on this list (anthrax, cholera,
plague, and smallpox).23 Each of these vaccines was developed in the 1970s or
earlier, and none is proven to protect humans against weaponized versions of
these pathogens. Furthermore, manufacturers have ceased producing FDA-
licensed versions of all but one of these vaccines (anthrax).24 Once develop-
ment begins, new biodefense vaccines are not likely to reach licensure for
another ve to ten years.25
Although the need for new and improved biodefense vaccines is clear, the
means for acquiring them is not. Commercial incentives for the pharmaceutical
and biotechnology industries to develop biodefense vaccines are few in num-
ber because vaccines protect against diseases with low-to-no natural incidence
in traditional markets, and the use of these vaccines is typically limited to
military and laboratory settings.
Recent government attempts to procure biodefense vaccines have failed to
compensate for poor commercial incentives. In 1994, the Department of De-
fense (DoD) established the Joint Vaccine Acquisition Program (JVAP) in an at-
tempt to bring experimental biodefense vaccines to licensure. The JVAP has a
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23. For a list of biological threat agents, see http://www.cdc.gov.od/sap/resource.html.
24. A 1970s´ version of the smallpox vaccine has recently been relicensed, but supplies are limited
because the pharmaceutical industry no longer manufactures this version, which contains vaccinia
virus cultured on calf bellies. Acambis, a U.K.-based rm, is developing a “cleaner” version of the
smallpox vaccine containing cell-cultured vaccinia virus, which the FDA is expected to approve in
2004.
25. Dr. Anna Johnson-Winegar, deputy assistant to the U.S. defense secretary for chemical and bio-
logical defense, expects that the Department of Defense will have an improved smallpox vaccine
by 2006 and a tularemia vaccine by 2012. One exception is the new cell-cultured smallpox vaccine
under development at Acambis.
budget of $747 million to develop eight vaccines. To date, this program has
failed to license a single new biodefense vaccine. According to interviews con-
ducted with a senior scientist and Centers for Disease Control (CDC) ofcial,
the pharmaceutical industry “guffaws” at the JVAP´s paltry contracts, citing
$500 million to $1 billion as the average development cost for a new vaccine.26
Without assistance from the commercial sector, the military has been unable to
engineer and manufacture enough vaccine to conduct large clinical trials for
FDA licensure.
Given the protracted and unpredictable nature of biological threats, there
will be a long-term government demand for a range of commercially unattrac-
tive vaccines to build and maintain national pharmaceutical stockpiles. Recog-
nizing the need to move quickly to develop new biodefense vaccines, the Bush
administration has proposed making $5.6 billion available to develop these
vaccines over the next ten years through Project Bioshield.27 Should Congress
approve this level of funding, Project Bioshield may raise incentives for vac-
cine manufacturers.28
To fully capitalize on opportunities presented in proposals such as Project
Bioshield, security planners must understand the dynamics of biomedical in-
novation in the commercial sector to ensure that effective and safe biodefense
vaccines are developed as quickly as possible. The next section of this article
argues that it is essential for U.S. policymakers concerned with bolstering
biodefense capabilities in general, and vaccine development in particular, to
understand how economic globalization has reshaped the nature of technolog-
ical development in the biotechnology sector in recent decades. Unless this is
recognized, policymakers risk taking counterproductive steps in the pursuit of
enhanced biosecurity.
Globalization and the Changed Parameters of Vaccine Development
A number of recent analyses have recognized the importance of preserving
openness in the conduct and communication of scientic research, both do-
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26. Amy Smithson and Leslie Anne Levy, Ataxia: The Chemical and Biological Terrorism Threat and the
U.S. Response, Report No. 35 (Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2001), p. 317.
27. “President Details Project Bioshield,” White House press release, February 3, 2003, http://
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030203.html.
28. Marilyn Chase, “Project Bioshield Is a Big Incentive to Vaccine Makers,” Wall Street Journal,
February 3, 2003, p. D2. In addition to ensuring funds, Project Bioshield will give the National In-
stitutes of Health authority to fast-track biodefense grants, and it will give the FDA authority to
approve the use of investigational vaccines and drugs in an emergency.
mestically and internationally, in the face of the threat from bioterrorism.29 Al-
though collaboration among academic scientists across borders is essential, it is
only one facet of globalization that is relevant to biodefense. What has not been
sufciently recognized is the signicance of international collaboration among
biotechnology and pharmaceutical rms. With respect to vaccine develop-
ment, the commercial sector is indispensable: Not only is it the sole source of
manufacturing expertise, but industry efforts to translate pilot lots into large-
scale production require specialized research and bioengineering capabilities.
new globalization strategies for a new technological environment
Although rms have always collaborated in production activities across bor-
ders, the form and extent of globalization linkages that have emerged over the
past three decades are historically unique. Two new globalization strategies
that many rms have turned to during this period—international subcontract-
ing and the pursuit of technological cooperation agreements—are particularly
relevant to vaccine development.
The rst is international subcontracting. Of course, there has always been
subcontracting—that is, contracting out to other rms for the production of
components, supplies, and sometimes entire products. What is new is the in-
ternational component of this strategy. As Peter Dicken stresses, “An
important development of the past thirty years has been the extension of sub-
contracting across national boundaries: the emergence of international subcon-
tracting as an important global activity. The revolution in transport and
communications technology, together with developments in the production
process itself, have created the potential for rms to establish subcontracting
networks over vast geographical distances.”30
Most signicant for vaccine development, however, is a second new global-
ization strategy: pursuing technological cooperation agreements with rms in
other countries. These cooperation agreements, which can focus on produc-
tion, R&D, or both simultaneously, are attractive to rms because many of the
same benets of collaboration usually associatedwith mergers can be achieved
without having to deal with any of the complicated and contentious issues as-
sociated with changes in long-term ownership. Although comprehensive data
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29. See Skolnikoff, “Research Universities and National Security”; Chan et al., In the Public Interest;
and Stern, “Dreaded Risks and the Control of Biological Weapons.”
30. Peter Dicken, Global Shift: Transforming the World Economy (New York: Guilford, 1998), p. 233
(emphasis in original).
on technological cooperation agreements do not exist, the number of such
agreements has risen dramatically from near zero since the mid-1970s.31
Why have so many rms recently turned to international subcontracting and
technological cooperation agreements? A key reason is that both of these strat-
egies help rms cope with the rapid increase in the cost, risk, complexity, and
scale of technological development that has occurred in the last several de-
cades.32 In this technological environment, international subcontracting is at-
tractive because it allows rms to specialize in those aspects of production that
use resources and capabilities in which the rm has a perceived competitive
advantage.33 In turn, technological cooperation agreements make it easier for
rms to minimize the risk/cost of engaging in R&D and enhance the potential
for innovation. As François Chesnais points out, in a world of “rapid and radi-
cal technological change, the new forms of agreements offer rms a way of en-
suring, in a wide variety of situations, a high degree of exibility in their
operations. When technology is moving rapidly, the exible and risk-sharing
(or indeed risk-displacing) features of inter-rm agreements offer rms a wide
range of opportunities for acquiring key scientic and technical assets from
outside their own walls. . . . Inter-rm agreements can likewise provide rms
with a possibility of pooling limited resources in the face of rising R&D
costs.”34
The cost, risk, complexity, and scale of technological development have
greatly increased in recent decades in the area of biopharmaceutical drug
development. During the 1990s alone, R&D budgets in the pharmaceutical in-
dustry increased threefold.35 To cope with the changed parameters of tech-
nological development, rms in this sector have strongly turned to greater in
international collaboration. Since 1970 the number of technological coopera-
tion agreements has exploded (see Figure 1). Given the historical strength of
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31. Stephen Kobrin, “The Architecture of Globalization: State Sovereignty in a Networked Global
Economy,” in John H. Dunning, ed., Governments, Globalization, and International Business (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 150.
32. See, for example, ibid., pp. 149–150; and Lynn Krieger Mytelka, “Crisis, Technological Change,
and the Strategic Alliance,” in Mytelka, ed., Strategic Partnerships: States, Firms, and International
Competition (Rutherford, N.J.: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1991), pp. 16–21, and the
sources cited therein.
33. See, for example, Geoffrey Jones, The Evolution of International Business: An Introduction (Lon-
don: Routledge, 1996), p. 142.
34. François Chesnais, “Preface,” in Mytelka, Strategic Partnerships, p. x.
35. Sarah C. Stallings, Robert H. Rubin, Thomas J. Allen, Charles M. Cooney, Anthony J. Sinskey,
and Stan N. Finkelstein, “Technological Innovation in Pharmaceuticals,” Working Paper No. 59-01
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Program on the Pharmaceutical Industry, 2001), p. 2.
U.S. rms in the biotechnology sector and the size of the U.S. economy, one
might suppose that a large number of the technological cooperation agree-
ments in this sector would be limited to U.S.-based rms. This is indeed the
case (see Figure 2). Figure 2 also reveals, however, that the level of collabora-
tion by U.S. rms in this sector with both Japanese and West European rms is
almost equal in signicance to that between U.S.-based rms. The bottom line
is that starting from a base of essentially zero, several hundred technological
cooperation agreements between U.S.-based rms and biotechnology rms in
other countries were formed during the 1970–89 period.
the increased importance of collaboration in vaccine development
Recent advances in molecular biology and genetic engineering have led to new
vaccine development strategies. At the same time, this explosion of technologi-
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Figure 1. Number of Technological Cooperation Agreements Formed in Biotechnology
from the Early 1950s to 1989.
SOURCE: John Hagedoorn and Jos Schakenraad, ª Strategic Partnering and Technological Co-
Operation,º in Ben Dankbaar and John Groenewegen, eds., Perspectives in Industrial Or-
ganization (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer, 1990), p. 176.
cal opportunity has made it progressively more difcult for any one rm to
assemble the optimal array of in-house development expertise. Expertise rele-
vant to early-stage vaccine development has become increasingly specialized
and more widely distributed. This trend is reected in the number of small,
dedicated biotechnology rms, which grew from just a handful in the 1970s to
1,457 in 2001.36
As the scientic and technological base for vaccine development has ex-
panded, so too have the costs. Although there is little publicly available data
on vaccine industry investments in biotechnology, one study was able to deter-
mine that overall levels of R&D devoted to vaccine development within the
pharmaceutical industry increased from 2 percent in the early 1980s to an aver-
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Figure 2. Geographic Nature of Technological Cooperation Agreements Formed in
Biotechnology from the Early 1950s to 1989.
SOURCE: John Hagedoorn and Jos Schakenraad, ª Strategic Partnering and Technological Co-
Operation,º in Ben Dankbaar and John Groenewegen, eds., Perspectives in Industrial Or-
ganization (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer, 1990), p. 177.
36. For this statistic, see Biotechnology Industry Organization, “No. of Biotech Companies, 1999–
2000, http://www.bio.org/investor/signs/200210num.asp.
age of 4 percent during the 1990s.37 Furthermore, it takes $300 million to $1 bil-
lion and seven to ten years to bring a single vaccine to market.38
Commercial vaccine developers have responded to the changed parameters
of technological development by expanding their reliance on outsourcing and
technological cooperation agreements. Increasingly, vaccines and other
biopharmaceuticals are being developed under collaborative R&D and pro-
duction efforts between large pharmaceutical companies and smaller biotech-
nology start-ups and academic and government research institutions.39
Pursuing collaboration is not only an efcient solution to the growing cost
and complexity of vaccine production; it is also a valuable source of innova-
tion.40 Vaccine development is a highly interdisciplinary endeavor that re-
quires a wide range of expertise to bring an effective product to market. Firms
in the vaccine industry, therefore, have much to gain from close working rela-
tionships with partners that share heterogeneous, yet complementary, R&D
capabilities. As three analysts note, these dense networks of collaborative rela-
tionships serve as “organizational devices for the coordination of heteroge-
neous learning processes by agents characterized by different skills,
competencies, access to information and assets.”41
In the area of vaccine development, the advantages of partnerships between
large pharmaceutical companies and smaller biotechnology rms are particu-
larly apparent. Small biotechnology rms that are on the cutting edge of the
most recent scientic developments are often ideally suited to introduce prom-
ising new biodefense vaccine candidates. For example, Acambis, a small Brit-
ish biotechnology company, is producing the rst cell-culture version of the
smallpox vaccine for the U.S. government. Because of its experience with an
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array of genetic engineering techniques, Acambis is able to engineer immuno-
gens apart from the entire pathogen and thereby develop safer vaccines ac-
cording to FDA-recommended manufacturing practices.42 Unlike large
pharmaceutical companies, however, small biotechnology rms such as
Acambis generally do not have the expertise or facilities to perform late-stage
vaccine development and manufacturing.43 To produce the smallpox vaccine,
Acambis has partnered with Baxter International, a large, U.S.-based, medical
supply and manufacturing company. In short, small biotechnology rms and
large pharmaceutical companies have different strengths that, when combined,
can more effectively develop biodefense vaccines.
the globalization of u.s. biodefense vaccine efforts
The need to pursue partnerships to maintain high rates of innovation for vac-
cine development has grown rapidly in recent years. In early 2003 President
Bush observed, “Right now America must go beyond our borders to nd com-
panies willing to make vaccines to combat biological weapons.”44 As the need
for international collaboration has grown, the ability of companies and re-
search institutes to work with international partners has also greatly increased.
Of particular importance in this regard are recent advances in communications
technology that have made it possible to share specications, plans, data, and
so on in real time.45 In light of these trends, it is not surprising that interna-
tional biotechnology companies now play an important role in U.S. biodefense
vaccine research. Of the top-six Class A biological threat agents identied
by the HHS (anthrax, Botulinum toxin, plague, smallpox, tularemia, and
viral hemorrhagic fevers such as Ebola), vaccines for all but one (Botulinum
toxin) are being developed in cooperation with international biotechnology
companies.46
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Finding a safer alternative to the current smallpox vaccine is a major priority
for the biodefense community, and international collaborative ventures are re-
sponsible for many alternatives under investigation. As noted above, Acambis
and Baxter are in the late stages of developing a cell-cultured version of the
smallpox vaccine, and one of Baxter´s overseas afliates in Austria will pro-
duce the vaccine.47 In addition to this project, Bavarian Nordic, a German-
Danish company based in Copenhagen, is developing a promising alternative
with the modied vaccinia Ankara strain of the vaccinia virus for which the
National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) is considering a
contract for 30 million doses.48 Similarly, VaxGen, a California company, has
been working with Kaketsuken, a Japanese company, to begin clinical trials on
a vaccine with the Japanese-developed LC16-Kaketsuken strain.49 And most
recently, NIAID awarded Omrix Biopharmaceuticals, a Brussels-based com-
pany with research and production facilities in Israel, a two-year grant of more
than $3 million to develop vaccinia immunoglobulin rst-aid kits that individ-
uals can self-administer in an emergency.50
In October 2002, NIAID issued contracts to VaxGen and Avecia of Manches-
ter, England, to develop a civilian anthrax vaccine based on an experimental
vaccine developed by research scientists at the U.S. Army Medical Research In-
stitute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID).51 Similarly, biotechnology compa-
nies in two countries are cooperating on a NIAID contract to develop a vaccine
for Ebola. Vical, a California company, is developing the DNA component of
the vaccine, while Crucell, located in the Netherlands, is engineering a recom-
binant adenovirus vector for the vaccine.52
The search for a plague vaccine has an international element as well. Mili-
tary research laboratories in the United States and the United Kingdom
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(USAMRIID, and Porton Down, respectively) are following two promising
leads in parallel for a recombinant plague vaccine to protect humans against
aerosolized versions of the bacterium Yersinia pestis.53 DynPort Vaccine Com-
pany—a joint venture between DynCorp, based in Reston, Virginia, and
Porton International, a subsidiary of the French pharmaceutical company
Beaufour-Ipsen—is also developing a plague vaccine.
Finally, efforts to develop a tularemia vaccine also have a strong global com-
ponent. NIAID is pursuing the development of a civilian tularemia vaccine
through a number of early development grants to institutions in Canada, Rus-
sia, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.54 At the same time, the DoD has con-
tracted the DynPort Vaccine Company to develop another version of this
vaccine for the military.
Regulating toward Autarky
In response to the September 2001 terrorist attacks, federal agencies and law-
makers in the United States constructed a new regulatory framework to make
it more difcult for terrorists to obtain dangerous biological agents and sensi-
tive research information. Though this framework is designed to enhance U.S.
security, it is likely to have the unintended and counterproductive effect of en-
couraging a shift away from globalization; this is the case with respect to vac-
cine development, in particular, and U.S. biodefense efforts, more generally.
a new regulatory framework
The U.S. biosecurity regulatory framework delineates new restrictions on the
use of select agents, the activities of select foreign research scientists and stu-
dents, and the communication of sensitive research.55 Its primary objective is
to make it more difcult for potential adversaries to exploit open systems of re-
search, education, and commerce in the biological sciences to develop biologi-
cal weapons.
Select agent restrictions are outlined in the USA Patriot Act of 2001 and the
Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness Act of 2002, which
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criminalize the unauthorized possession, use, or transfer of the forty-nine bio-
logical agents or toxins listed by HHS. Individuals working with these agents
must register with HHS and institute access controls, handling and reporting
requirements, and personnel screening for their labs. HHS must also develop a
national database of registered individuals and institutions as well as informa-
tion about the pathogens they possess.
These acts introduce numerous personnel restrictions as well. Both acts pro-
hibit universities from employing individuals from several foreign countries
(currently seven) to work with select biological agents and toxins listed by
HHS.56 All other employees in these laboratories—from principal investigators
to janitors—are subject to extensive background checks to determine if they are
security risks. In May 2002, the DoD restricted access to research data and facil-
ities among foreign citizens as well. New visa regulations, as well as new
approaches to scrutinizing applications, have introduced another layer of per-
sonnel restrictions.57 As a result, numerous foreign researchers were barred
from the United States in the rst half of 2003, leading to the disruption of
more than two dozen research projects related to biodefense at twenty univer-
sities.58 New visa regulations have also increased the ability of the federal gov-
ernment to monitor the activities of foreign students and researchers as well as
educational institutions to ensure compliance with the new guidelines.
Given the links between biological research and commerce and weapons de-
velopment, other regulations are now likely to be applied more broadly as
well. The International Trafc in Arms Regulations (ITAR), for example, regu-
late the export of all weapons-related knowledge. Although these regulations
have traditionally applied to space research and munitions development,
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Eugene Skolnikoff notes that the life sciences may not be exempt.59 Under
ITAR, U.S. researchers must obtain an export license before sharing informa-
tion with non-NATO foreign students and scientists. Violators of these regula-
tions, which cover not just formal collaborations but also informal interactions
such as meetings and emails, may be ned or imprisoned.
Meanwhile, the research community is receiving mixed messages regarding
future policy on the communication of sensitive biological research in the
United States. The White House declared that it intends to uphold a nearly
twenty-year-old policy of not placing restrictions on the conduct and commu-
nication of unclassied federally funded fundamental research, and yet the ad-
ministration has taken several measures that suggest otherwise.60 After
September 11, for example, the White House asked federal agencies to remove
“sensitive but unclassied,” material from their websites, thereby creating a
new, if poorly dened, category of restricted information.61 It also encouraged
the American Society of Microbiology (ASM, publisher of eleven scientic
journals) to restrict the publication of sensitive research papers. While the
presidents of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) warned that vague cat-
egories such as “sensitive but unclassied” would “generate deep uncertain-
ties . . . [and] stie scientic creativity,” the NAS, together with the ASM,
announced in January 2003 that the editors of more than thirty leading
scientic journals had agreed to screen potentially dangerous research from
their publications.62 In addition, the Department of Defense has indicated that
unclassied DoD-funded research may be subject to prepublication review. It
has not, however, issued an explicit policy to this effect.
incentives to shift away from globalization
Although this new regulatory framework is intended to reduce the threat of
bioterrorism, it could undercut the development of biodefenses. Some analysts
and researchers have argued that it will discourage scientic progress by U.S.
researchers in areas that require working with select pathogens and will make
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continuing research much less effective by restricting scientic openness.63 Al-
though these concerns are valid, they reect only part of the problem.
The ability to innovate and manufacture safe and effective biodefense tech-
nologies depends on the strength of three system components: the biodefense
research and commercial base in the United States; the biodefense research and
commercial base in other countries; and the interaction between them—that is,
the globalization of research and commerce in this area. Given that the pursuit
of globalization has an independent contribution to make in the development
of effective biodefense capabilities, an important unresolved question is
whether the new U.S. regulatory framework is likely to have a disproportion-
ately negative inuence on the scope of international collaboration in this area.
Although this framework will generally reduce the willingness of research-
ers and rms to participate in biodefense research, there are a number of
reasons to expect that it will be especially damaging to international collabora-
tion. One issue concerns the added bureaucratic and nancial costs associated
with conducting research on select pathogens. Dr. Michael Donneberg, head of
infectious disease research at the University of Maryland School of Medicine
asks, “Will all these forms we have to ll out impede our ability to do research?
It weighs into the question of whether to work with these agents.”64 Those
who cannot shoulder the new bureaucratic, nancial, and other burdens asso-
ciated with doing research on select pathogens will be driven out of the eld.
Foreign rms and researchers not subject to U.S. law also suffer from the un-
certainty and delays that these regulations generate. Rick Smith, director of
regulatory affairs at Aventis Pasteur, observes that the new select pathogen
rules have already slowed the pace of international collaboration. He notes
that whereas international collaboration was once relatively effortless, routine
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attempts to exchange seed strains between the United States, France, and Can-
ada are now bogged down for weeks in paperwork and delays.65 Moreover, if
foreign researchers and rms believe that major constraints could at some
point be placed on the way they conduct or disseminate research, they are
likely to choose to work with non-U.S. partners. In light of recent regulatory
changes, foreign rms and researchers working in areas relating to biodefense
have reason to expect that these restrictions will only become more stringent in
the years ahead.66
The new regulatory framework also raises the professional risk of working
with select pathogens. Research scientists took note when Dr. Thomas Butler,
chief of infectious diseases at Texas Tech University Medical School, ran afoul
of these regulations in January of 2003 by failing to document the destruction
of thirty vials of plague. Unable to account for the vials, Dr. Butler suggested
that they might have been misplaced or stolen. More than sixty federal, state,
and local law enforcement agents descended on the university; the media
splashed his name across the news; and he was charged and tried in a federal
court on sixty-nine counts of misconduct. Although acquitted of the most seri-
ous charges relating to the incident, Dr. Butler was convicted on forty-four
counts. Apart from the specics of this case, the manner in which scientists
who work with select pathogens will respond to these events is at issue. Pre-
dicting the reaction of the biomedical research community, Ronald Atlas, presi-
dent of the American Society for Microbiology, stated, “If I had select agents in
my lab, I think I´d give serious consideration in the morning as to whether I re-
ally want to do this or not.”67
These professional risks extend beyond the U.S. research community to
threaten international collaboration. In the Butler case, his arrest has inter-
rupted important collaborative efforts with the Tanzanian government to test a
potentially valuable plague therapy in areas of that country where plague is
endemic.68 More generally, foreign rms and researchers based outside the
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United States will likely think twice before assuming the added cost and risk of
choosing a U.S.-based partner as opposed to working with a partner located in
a country with less stringent standards. Moreover, foreign researchers and the
afliates of foreign companies located in the United States and interested in
doing work in this area may become less inclined to do so because of rapidly
evolving and unpredictable regulatory standards, particularly those concern-
ing visas and research rules.
For the above reasons, the new regulatory framework produces particularly
strong incentives for foreign rms and researchers to avoid or reduce their par-
ticipation in U.S. biodefense efforts. At the same time, the willingness and abil-
ity of U.S. rms and researchers to pursue international collaboration will also
be constrained given the difculties of working with foreign partners that are
not subject to the same set of pathogen, personnel, and publication regulations.
Long-term international collaboration becomes an increasingly risky proposi-
tion for rms and researchers operating in rapidly evolving and disparate reg-
ulatory environments for biosecurity. Indeed, the U.S. government could
decide at some point that these foreign partners are a security risk and move to
constrain their projects. Looking forward, many U.S. rms and researchers
working in biodefense may decide that the risk of having a long-term project
interrupted has become too great relative to the advantages of working with
foreign partners.
Future Policy Directions
The new U.S. biosecurity regulatory framework encourages a shift away from
globalization in research and production related to biodefense. Given the tra-
jectory of U.S. biosecurity regulations since September 2001, restrictions on the
conduct and communication of biological research and commerce are likely to
grow. Although the current regulations encourage a move away from global-
ization in biodefense efforts indirectly, the next round of regulations may do so
directly, especially in light of the view held among many analysts and policy-
makers that globalization serves to facilitate terrorism.
U.S. policymakers faced a similar set of decisions during the 1980s. At that
time, the increasing tendency of U.S. rms involved in defense-related produc-
tion to pursue globalization strategies troubled many American defense
analysts. Some of these analysts argued for dramatically scaling back the
globalization of U.S. weapons production.69 Congress did, in fact, initiate a
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sharp increase in the number of “Buy American” restrictions in weapons pro-
duction during the 1980s.70 The practical effect of these restrictive policies,
however, was essentially nil: In response to lobbying by the DoD, Congress al-
lowed for a variety of exceptions to these Buy American restrictions, which the
DoD then rigorously exploited.71 In the end, the globalization of U.S. weapons
production proceeded largely unchecked. The decision to embrace globaliza-
tion in U.S. defense production was clearly the right one. The Soviet Union fell
signicantly behind the United States in military technology during the 1980s,
and a key reason why is that the U.S. government pursued globalization in its
defense-related production during this period while the Soviets did not.72 In
short, Washington successfully leveraged economic globalization to help the
United States rapidly outpace its adversary during the nal phase of the Cold
War.
Our analysis indicates that national policymakers should refrain from initi-
ating any direct restrictions on the globalization of U.S. biodefense efforts. But
what about the current U.S. biosecurity regulatory framework, which works
against the pursuit of globalization in biodefense only indirectly? Should all re-
cently enacted biosecurity regulations be eliminated? Some might conclude
yes, not just because these regulations constrain globalization in biodefense
but also because they may not be especially effective. In particular, some ana-
lysts have suggested that efforts to regulate access to materials and knowledge
relevant to the development of biological weapons will have limited success.73
With an estimated 800 laboratories in the United States working with any one
of the forty-nine pathogens and toxins controlled under the CDC´s select agent
program, federal ofcials have acknowledged the difculty of their task.74 In
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addition to efforts to control select agents, M.R.C. Greenwood (chancellor of
the University of California, Santa Cruz) notes that attempts to stem the prolif-
eration of biological tools and expertise will be even more difcult. She likens
this situation to “a modern version of closing the barn door after the horse has
left.”75 The spread of nuclear weapons technology after World War II under-
scores this point, demonstrating that even under a strict classication regime,
forming a hermetic seal around “sensitive” knowledge is impossible. In com-
parison, containing the spread of biological weapons poses a far greater chal-
lenge due, in part, to the dispersion of technologies and knowledge through
the growth of the international biotechnology industry.
Against this line of argument is a stark reality: The biological proliferation
threat is real, and the world cannot ignore highly dangerous activities in the bi-
ological sciences and in the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industry.76 The
issue is not whether regulations are needed, but the form they should take.
How is it possible to reduce the biological proliferation threat without compro-
mising the ability to develop adequate biodefenses?
We argue that an international regime that establishes a uniform set of
biosecurity regulations may offer the best solution. On its face, an international
biosecurity regime would seem to exacerbate the regulatory burden on bio-
defense research. Policymakers searching for a moderate solution to the threat
of biological banditry are therefore more likely to opt for a series of stopgap
domestic regulations. As demonstrated above, however, this strategy solves
some problems but unintentionally creates others.
Various proposals for an international biosecurity governance regime are al-
ready on the table.77 Two are notable in their call for uniform, enforceable
biosecurity standards across countries. Michael Barletta, Amy Sands, and Jona-
than Tucker advocate the development of a biosecurity convention that would
provide a legally binding, multilateral mechanism for participant countries to
negotiate and enforce biosecurity standards akin to those of the CDC select
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agent program.78 Similarly, John Steinbruner and his group at the Center for
International Security Studies at Maryland have proposed a protective over-
sight system for sensitive biological research on an international scale. This
system takes the idea of a biosecurity convention a step further by calling for a
biological research security system that would not only track the pathogens
themselves but would also oversee particularly dangerous categories of re-
search.79 Steinbruner advocates a tiered system in which “potentially danger-
ous” research activities would be monitored locally, “moderately dangerous”
activities nationally, and “extremely dangerous activities” internationally.80 Al-
though oversight jurisdiction would be tiered, all research activities would
abide by legally binding uniform international standards. Most signicantly,
this proposal provides a mechanism for the independent evaluation of re-
search projects before the work begins.
Neither of these proposals was expressly designed to facilitate international
collaboration, and they would ostensibly appear to threaten biodefense re-
search and development initiatives through excessive regulation. They do,
however, ameliorate the much larger problems introduced by balkanized
biosecurity regulatory regimes. In part for this reason, an international regula-
tory regime is likely to receive the support of U.S.-based industry leaders. As
Tucker explains, “Because the U.S. pharmaceutical and biotechnology compa-
nies that work with select agents already face strengthened domestic regula-
tions, they would benet from a level regulatory playing-eld vis-à-vis
competitors in Europe and Japan.”81 From a business perspective, an interna-
tional regime would not only level the playing eld but would also reduce un-
certainty—a key factor that currently discourages long-term commitment to
cross-national collaboration. Under a protective oversight regime, for example,
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a research team could receive ofcial assurance that its project complied with
international biosecurity standards, thereby signicantly reducing the long-
term regulatory risks of undertaking an international collaborative project.
Over time, the bureaucratic hassles associated with biosecurity compliance
would diminish as reporting requirements are standardized and harmonized
across borders. Moreover, it will likely be possible to reduce the number of na-
tionality-based personnel restrictions in direct proportion to the number of
countries that comply with the international regulatory regime.
In sum, internationally enforced biosecurity regulations would, at a mini-
mum, harmonize biosecurity regulations and thereby eliminate the indirect in-
centives for autarky in biodefense research and production that are generated
by an exclusively domestic regulatory regime. At best, an international regime
will both facilitate international collaboration and provide a more effective
means of preventing the hostile use of biology. Although a biosecurity regime
that covers a broad range of countries would be preferable, even one limited to
countries in North America, Western Europe, and Japan would be extremely
benecial because international collaboration in this area is largely limited to
these regions. This is reected in Figure 2, which shows that more than 90 per-
cent of all technological cooperation agreements in the biotechnology sector
involve companies from North America, Western Europe, and Japan. Encour-
aging a coalition of countries from these regions to adopt international
biosecurity standards would be both practical and useful.
Conclusion
After the terrorist attacks of September 2001, many scholars and policymakers
began to argue that economic globalization facilitates terrorism. This is only
half right. While economic globalization does enhance the threat of terrorism,
it also facilitates the effort to respond to this threat. Our examination reveals
that to reduce the bioterrorist threat, it is crucial to make rapid progress in vac-
cine development and that one of the best ways to do this is to preserve inter-
national systems of collaboration, especially among commercial rms. In short,
all aspects of the globalization trade-off must be considered in the ongoing ef-
fort to reduce the threat of terrorism in general and bioterrorism in particular.
To date, U.S. biosecurity policy has not adequately factored in the
signicance of globalization. Focusing on the threat that sensitive materials
and knowledge will fall into the hands of a would-be bioterrorist, the U.S. gov-
ernment recently adopted an exclusively domestic regulatory framework. One
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unintended consequence of this policy shift is that it encourages a move to-
ward more autarkic research and production strategies in the biodefense sec-
tor. To avoid this problem and ensure that the globalization of biodefense
continues, it is necessary to harmonize regulations in this area through the cre-
ation of an international biosecurity regime. Taking this route will not only
eliminate the incentives for autarky in the development of biodefense technol-
ogies, but it also promises a more effective means to guard against the hostile
use of biology.
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